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NOTES
JUDICIAL APPEAL FROM GENERAL PROPERTY AS-
SESSMENTS IN MISSOURI
That the administration of the tax system in Missouri is un-
satisfactory is admitted even by those administering it. What
is the proper means of correcting and revising it is a matter of
disagreement; but in this problem a most important phase is
the intervention of the courts in the administrative process of
levying and collecting taxes to correct errors and to protect the
taxpayers' interests.
The most important tax in Missouri, as it is elsewhere, is the
general property tax. According to the State Tax Commissions'
report for 1931 about three fourths of the total tax collected for
state and county purposes was from levies based on general
property assessments. Touching as it does a large number of
citizens it is natural that more controversies arise in its assess-
ment than in the ease of any other tax.
Briefly, the tax assessment process in Missouri is as follows :1
the assessor fixes the value of the property and enters the same
on the assessment book, which work must be completed by Jan-
uary 20th. He turns the books over to the county clerk who
submits an abstract to the State Auditor and makes a copy of
the assessment books and computes the amount of taxes, this
copy to be known as the tax book. On the first Monday in April
(except in large cities) the county board of equalization meets,
goes over the assessment book, revises, corrects and hears the
taxpayers' complaints. The State Board of Equalization passes
on the values set and notifies the county clerk of changes to be
made, which are made by the county board, of equilization; if it
has adjourned, then by the clerk himself. The tax book, after
the corrections are made and the above work completed by the
county clerk, is turned over to the tax collector. This is usually
done about the first of September. Taxes become due on the first
I As to assessment, see R. S. Mo. (1929) secs. 9749 to 9810. As to duties
of clerks: R. S. Mo. (1929) secs. 9876 to 9882 (compilation of the tax-
books); sec. 9817 (making changes as ordered by the State Board of
Equalization); sec. 9759 (has no power to make changes of his own ac-
cord). As to the county board of equalization: R. S. Mo. (1929) secs.
9811 to 9918; state tax commission: R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 9854; State
Board of Equalization; R. S. Mo. (1929) secs. 9861 to 9865.
The procedure is somewhat different in large cities. R. S. Mo. (1929)
secs. 10155 to 10164 provide for the county assessor acting as city asses-
sor in cities of 200,000 to 500,000 population and prescribe different time
limits. Secs. 10146 to 10155 apply to cities from 200,000 to 700,000, setting
out the powers of tax officials. In the City of St. Louis the assessor per-
forms the duties of the county clerk in extending taxes on books. R. S. Mo.
(1929) secs. 9806-7.
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of October. It will be noted that the taxes due and payable on
October first are based on the assessment made on June first of
the previous year. In other words, taxes are always one year
behind the assessment. The intervening time is utilized for
assessing and for accomplishing the book work, such as copying
of the tax books, figuring and extending the taxes, and the
process of equalization, noted above.
I. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF DEFECTS AND ERRORS IN ASSESS-
MENT WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
1. Defects and Errors in Putting a Valuation on Property.
This class of errors deals with the assessors' action in placing
the money value on the property assessed. The statutory guide
imposed is, "its true value in money at the time of the assess-
ment."' 2 True value has been defined as the price which a willing
seller would take and an able and willing buyer would give.
Thus, contrary to popular belief, true value is not the price the
property would bring at a forced sale, "under the hammer," but
the value is fixed as the price obtainable by a sale without re-
straint or compulsion.
The disputes which arise in connection with this phase of as-
sessment are those arising from alleged excessive, unequal, and
fraudulent or dishonest assessments. The discretionary acts of
the assessor or other tax officials will not be controlled or re-
viewed by the courts. Tax officials are free to use their judg-
ment untrammeled by judicial supervision. Judges will not sub-
stitute their judgment for the assessors'. In this respect
the courts have treated the assessors' decisions as they wouldjudgments of other courts. This attitude was expressed in an
early Missouri case as foltows :3 "The valuation of property for
the purpose of taxation is confided to the skill and judgment
of the assessor who acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.
There is no provision for an appeal from his decisions to the
courts, nor have the courts any supervisory control over his pro-
ceedings. However grossly the assessor may err his estimate is
conclusive as the verdict of a jury and the tax based on the as-
sessment like a judicial sentence can be attacked only for fraud
or want of jurisdiction."
An excessive valuation is not subject to correction by anyjudicial body unless it was fraudulently or dishonestly placed
by the assessor. A mere showing of overvaluation which might
have resulted from error or mistake of judgment is not evidence
2 R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 9792. For a definition of true and actual value
see, State v. Woodward (1922) 208 Ala. 31, 93 So. 826; Underwood Type-
writer Co. v. City of Hartford (1923) 99 Conn. 329, 122 At]. 91.
3 Hamilton v. Rosenblatt (1880) 8 Mo. App. 237.
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sufficient to establish fraud.4 It is not always necessary that
fraud actually be shown but it may be constructively proved by
a showing of sufficient grossness of assessment. Sufficient gross-
ness of assessment has not been satisfactorily defined by the
courts but is said to be, in a no more explanatory term, great ex-
cessiveness. No exact limits have been set, but upon an appeal
from a raise ordered by the State Board of Equalization the Su-
preme Court said that a 120 percent valuation does not make out
a prima facie right of recovery in the taxpayer. 5 In another case
a valuation amounting to 114 percent was held not to be a con-
structively fraudulent assessment.6
Closely related to excessive valuations are discriminatory or
unequal assessments. Similarly, there must be a showing of
fraud to attack successfully the value assessed. A systematic
and intentional assessment of one class of property higher or
lower than another is fraud which enters into the very concoction
of the assessment determination and is fatal to the determina-
tion when raised in court by the proper proceedings. Thus, if
banks are assessed at 100 percent of their value and all other
property at 50 percent, relief would be given the banks when
the facts of discrimination are proved or are admitted by the
tax officials.7 It is essential to the plaintiff's case that he show
that the discrimination was intentional on the part of the asses-
sor. It is not fraud if the error occurred accidentally, that is,
by honest mistake. A fraudulent omission of property from the
assessment rolls is subject to the same review as a fraudulent
assessment. Apart from a fraudulent system of assessment, in
a recent case,8 where the discrimination was not habitual and
against a large class of individuals, but one individual was il-
legally, wrongfully, and fraudulently discriminated against, the
court heard the complaint and gave the taxpayer relief. The
holding in this case should form the basis for many suits
not heretofore susceptible of judicial action, for relief previously
had been granted only in cases of a wrongful system of
assessment.
Any dishonest or fraudulent use of the assessors' powers
would fall in this class of appealable errors. Purposely placing a
man in the wrong taxing district, assessing an individual twice
4 St. Louis Electric Bridge Co. v. Koeln (1929) 319 Mo. 445, 3 S. W.
(2d) 1021.
Columbia Terminals Co. v. Koeln (1929) 319 Mo. 445, 3 S. W. (2d) 1021.
6 First Trust Co. of St. Joseph v. Wells (1930) 324 Mo. 306, 28 S. W.
(2d) 108.
T Boonville National Bank v. Schlotzhauer (1927) 317 Mo. 1298, 298
S. W. 732.
a Jefferson City Bridge and Transit Co. v. Blaser (1927) 318 Mo. 373, 300
S. W. 778.
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in the same year, delaying assessment to the extent that the tax-
payer loses his right of appeal by the delay, are illustrative of
transgressions in addition to high valuations amounting to
fraud. The same errors occurring by honest mistake would not
admit of judicial correction.
2. Lack of Jurisdiction in the Tax Officials
The above heading is a cover-all for a large number of defects
and is of little use when applied to specific instances. It is some-
times used as synonomous with lack of authority. In other cases
it may mean lack of physical jurisdiction, or it may mean failure
to observe the proper procedure in assessing. The assessment
of exempt property is reviewable because the assessor had no
authority and hence no jurisdiction.9 Failure to give notice of a
raise in valuation or to leave an original notice prevents the
making of a valid raise or assessment, and is usually categorized
as a lack of jurisdiction. A person not resident within the state
on the first day of June would not be within the jurisdiction of
the authorities for tax purposes. Property situated in another
state would be without the jurisdiction of Missouri tax officials
although the person may be within the jurisdiction.
No adequate generalization is possible, but following out the
analogy drawn from the same problem as to judgments of ju-
dicial bodies, the courts have said that a lack of jurisdiction in
the taxing authorities renders a tax finding void. What is a
lack of jurisdiction can be determined only by reference to cases
similar to the one in hand.
3. Failure to Observe Statutory Provisions as to the Manner of
Making the Assessment and Listing Property and Similar
Irregularities
Statutory provisions as to assessment fall into two groups,
those for the instruction and guidance of the assessing or re-
viewing officials, directory in character; and those for the pro-
tection of the taxpayer which are mandatory on the officials.
Errors occurring in administering the second group of statutory
provisions may be raised by the taxpayer by means of judicial
review. Obviously, since the first group was not enacted for his
benefit, the taxpayer cannot be heard to complain of a failure
to follow them. Clerical errors do not invalidate the assessment
nor do irregularities due to failure to observe the method pre-
scribed for making up the tax books.1° Errors of the assessor in
9 National Metal Edge Box Co. v. Readsboro (1920) 94 Vt. 405, 111 Ati.
386. See also Const. Mo. Art. 10, Sec. 6.
10 In the following cases the error was held not to invalidate the assess-
ment. Clerical errors, statutory errors, and informalities in assessment are
included. Thomas v. Chapin (1893) 116 Mo. 396, 22 S. W. 785 (tax books
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making the original list are not fatal. Such errors are: listing
the assessment in a lump sum instead of listing each item sep-
arately; failure to make a list after the taxpayer did not return
one although the assessor made the assessment without a list
of his own knowledge. That informality of assessment does not
invalidate is provided by statute." This adds little to the tax-
payers' protection for it has been taken to mean that failure to
follow methods of assessment prescribed by statute are not fatal
unless they are provisions for the protection of the taxpayer
(group two above).
In the second group the most important statutory provisions
are the requirements for notice of the original assessment and
of changes by boards of appeal and review, and for a hearing
of the taxpayers' complaints. Due process requires a notice
and hearing at some stage during the process of assessment. It
does not have to come before the assessment leaves the assessor's
hand or at any particular stage, but it is sufficient if the citizen
knows the amount of his assessment and is given an opportunity
to be heard at some time before the tax is made final.12 The
Missouri statutes require that notice of the original assessment
on personal property be made by calling at the place of residence
or office of the citizen, and, if he is not there, by leaving a list
and notice, or by making the assessment and leaving a duplicate
with a person over fourteen years of age.' 3 These provisions
must be strictly complied with. Where the assessor made the
assessment and left verbal notice the assessment was held in-
valid and the tax based upon it was uncollectible.' 4 The notice
in two volumes instead of one as prescribed by statute); State ex rel.
Brookfield v. Hurt (1892) 113 Mo. 90, 20 S. W. 879 (owner described as
unknown although on record in the recorder's office) ; State ex rel. Wyatt v.
Vaile (1894) 122 Mo. 33, 26 S. W. 672 (abbreviations in tax books held suf-
ficient) ; Skillman v. Clardy (1914) 256 Mo. 279,165 S. W. 1050 (abbreviations
in land description not error) ; State ex rel. Rehle v. Stam (1901) 165 Mo.
73, 65 S. W. 242 (separation of owner's property in listing); State ex rel
Teare v. Dungan (1915) 265 Mo. 353, 177 S. W. 604 (alterations by the
county clerk) ; State ex rel. Wennecker v. Cummings (1899) 151 Mo. 49,
52 S. W. 29 (failure to list separately classes of property assessed) ; State
ex rel. Hudson v. Carr (1903) 178 Mo. 229, 77-S. W. 543 (failure to make
a list when taxpayer made no return on his property) ; State ex rel. Teare
v. Dungan, above (assessment copied from the books of previous year);
State ex rel. Donnell v. Bank (Mo. 1924) 263 S. W. 205 (bank president
failed to list bank shares in names of the owners) ; but note State ex rel.
Flentge v. Burroughs (1903) 174 Mo. 700, 74 S. W. 610 (failure to describe
correctly real estate fatal to collection of tax on it).
11 R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 9771.
12 R. S. Mo. (1929) secs. 9756, 9757, and 9796.
23 Cooley, THE LAW OF TAxATIoN (4th ed. 1924) sec. 1123.
14 Cape Girardeau v. Bushman (1898) 148 Mo. 198, 49 S. W. 985.
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must be written but need not be otherwise formal. The asses-
sor may make a list himself only where the taxpayer fails to do
so, after notice was left.15 The return or list of the taxpayer is
not binding on the assessor as to the values listed, but its purpose
has been said to be to serve merely as memoranda for the as-
sessor's use.16 The question immediately suggests itself, if the
assessor makes a change in the list returned must he give notice
of the change to the taxpayer. That notice must be given has
been held,17 the court reasoning that if the assessor accepted the
list without objection the taxpayer is entitled to presume his
valuation will remain the same unless notified. In a later case
the Supreme Court held binding an assessment made after a list
was returned by the taxpayer and without notice.18 It was sug-
gested that since the assessment books remained in the office of
the county clerk for some time after leaving the assessor's care
the taxpayer had ample opportunity to determine the amount of
his assessment before the board of equalization met and that
he was not denied an opportunity to be heard. This holding
may be distinguished from the previous one on the facts of the
respective cases. In the first case an increase was made without
notice; in the second case the assessor placed a valuation on
building and loan shares which the taxpayer had omitted, and
as to which he had verbally instructed the assessor to fill in the
correct value. When a dispute arose as to the authority of the
assessor to place a value the court sustained the action of the
assessor. The question of a raise without notice was not directly
involved nor was the earlier case expressly overruled, although
it was mentioned by the court. The notice of the meetings of the
boards of equalization is given constructively by the statute
which specifies the date, and no further notice is necessary.
However, if an individual's valuation is raised or other changes
made in his tax, notice must be given either personally or by
publication.' 9 So, also, must the State Tax Commission give
notice of a contemplated raise on an individual or corporation
and give them an opportunity to be heard before the change
15 State ex rel. Ziegenheim v. Spencer (1893) 114 Mo. 574, 21 S. W. 837.
16 State ex rel. Rehle v. Stamm (1901) 165 Mo. 73, 65 S. W. 242.
17 State ex rel. Ziegenheim v. Spencer, n. 14 above. But compare State
ex rel. Hudson v. Carr (1903) 178 Mo. 229, 77 S. W. 543, where it was said
that the values by the taxpayer are not binding on the assessor. The
court also held that the assessment lists, whether made by the taxpayer
or by the assessor, are only memoranda for the personal use of the asses-
sor in making up the assessment books and are not evidence in a suit for the
collection of the tax assessed.
18 State ex rel Rehle v. Stamm (1901) n. 16 above.
19 R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 9813.
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is made.20 The State Board of Equalization has no power to
raise individual assessments and can order only horizontal in-
creases, that is, percentage raises on all property in a class and
in one county, and no notice is necessary.21 The protection given
taxpayers in Missouri in this respect is ample and far more
than merely satisfies due process.22 At every step the taxpayer
has notice and a right to be heard, and if the officials deny this
right the courts will entertain the objections to the tax levied
for the purpose of giving relief.
II. THE STAGES IN PROCEEDINGS FOR ASSESSMENT AND COLLECTION
OF TAXES AT WHICH A JUDICIAL APPEAL WILL LIE AND THE
TYPE OF REMEDIES AVAILABLE AT EACH STAGE
In approaching this problem it is necessary to bear in mind
that the courts hold that assessors and boards of equalization
act judicially or quasi-judicially, and that their determinations
are to be treated like judgments, subject to the same rules which
apply to judgments of regular courts. 23 In general, judgments
may be attacked directly or collaterally. A judgment which is
irregular admits of only a direct attack, but a judgment which
is void is susceptible of either direct or collateral attack. In tax
proceedings irregular judgments are those which are faulty by
reason of an error or defect which is not fatal to the judgment
when raised in a judicial proceeding, such as were indicated
previously. When the error is one which renders the determina-
tion null, such as does fraud in its concoction or lack of jurisdic-
tion, the judgment is said to be void. By direct attacks the
courts usually mean all forms of questioning a judgment pro-
vided for by statute. Conversely, all attacks aside from the
statutory ones in which proceedings the legality of the judgment
is a material issue are called collateral. A collateral attack is
considered available at any time whether a means of direct at-
tack is yet open or not since it is based on the complete nullity
of the judgment. If a party fails to question an irregular judg-
ment by the procedure set up by statute, he is in no position to
urge the defectiveness or erroneousness of the determination
when the findings are used against him in a subsequent pro-
ceeding to collect the tax. Public policy requires that weight be
given judgments as solemn records on which valuable rights
rest and that they should not be lightly overthrown or disturbed.
From the foregoing it will be seen that considerable importance
attaches to whether the attack on the determination is direct
2O R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 9854.
21 See Columbia Terminals Co. v. Koeln, n. 5 above.
22 As to what is due process in tax suits see Cooley, op. cit. n. 13 above.
23 ibid.
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or collateral in its nature.2 4 In Missouri certiorari is a method
of direct attack. Injunction, contrary to the general rule, has
also been designated a direct attack.25 In the Jefferson City
Bridge and Transit Company v. Blaser case, the court defined a
collateral attack as one which impeaches the judgment in a pro-
ceeding not instituted for the purpose of annulling it. Since
an injunction suit to restrain collection of a tax is a proceeding
directly questioning the judgment, and since its sole object is to
deny and disprove the validity of the judgment it is justifiably
classified as a direct attack.
Defenses in suits for the collection of a tax, suits to recover
money paid under an assessment, suits to annul tax deeds, and
any similar proceeding are included in a classification of col-
lateral attacks.
In connection with direct court attacks on the determinations
of tax officials it is important to note that all statutory remedies
must be exhausted before the courts will entertain a suit to an-
nul the tax. This fundamental principle, which has been termed
"administrative impregnability by estoppel, ' 26 is strictly ad-
hered to by Missouri courts. The Missouri Supreme Court in
Trust Company v. Hill2 7 said, "To permit taxpayers through the
state, who feel aggrieved through alleged discriminatory assess-
ments of their property to stand silently by until after the taxes
have become due and are pressed for collection and then resist
by injunction would produce an intolerable condition. The col-
lection of revenue would be so obstructed that both state and
local government would be seriously crippled if nothing more."
The Court then proceeded to deny the appeal because the Trust
Company had not gone before the State Tax Commission with
its complaint, and consequently had not exhausted its statutory
appeals. It was said that the State Tax Commission should
have been appealed to because it was given power to investigate
and institute proceedings to correct irregular and fraudulent
assessments.28 In previous decisions no mention had been made
of the necessity of appealing to the Commission and the courts
had given relief without reference to such an appeal. By this
decision a new addition was added to the administrative law of
appeals in tax cases. In a subsequent appeal to the Federal
courts, based on a claim of a deprivation of property without due
process of law, the case was reversed because a new provision
had been added to the previous statute of which change the Trust
24 Freeman, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) secs. 304, 305, and 306.
26 N. 8 above.
26 See Statson, Judicial Review of Taz Errors (1930) 28 MIcH. L. Rsv.
637.
2T (1929) 323 Mo. 180, 19 S. W. (2d) 746.
28 R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 9854.
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Company had no notice, and consequently no opportunity to con-
form with it. The rule laid down, however, was not disturbed
and remains the law in Missouri. An exhausting of the statu-
tory appeals necessary' to obtain an appeal to a judicial body
apparently would consist of appeals to the county board of
equalization, to the State Tax Commission, and to the State
Board of Equalization, if possible. (The State Board of Equali-
zation has no power to make individual adjustments, but only
such as involve a class of property.)
The type of remedy available for testing tax determinations
in a judicial forum depends more upon the stage at which relief
is sought than upon the substantive defect which is to be cor-
rected. With few exceptions, to be noted later, the errors which
are subject to judicial review are the same whatever type of
proceeding is instituted. The main defects were discussed in the
first part of this note. Consideration will now be given to the
remedies available and best adaptable to proceedings in the va-
rious stages of assessing and collecting taxes.
1. Appeal from the Decision of the Original Assessing Offlcer
The origina! action of the assessor in placing the valuation is
difficult to question by court action. The direct statutory appeal
is open and in view of the principle laid down above it would be
difficult to conceive of a factual situation that would permit im-
mediate judicial action. Certiorari would review the acts of the
assessor if it could be obtained since the assessor is said to act
judicially. In view of the attitude of the courts toward the use
of this writ, to be indicated later, it could be obtained and made
use of in very few instances. Mandamus has been used to com-
pel acts which the assessor was by law required to perform, but
his discretion was not controlled. If the assessor refused to as-
sess certain property, mandamus would be the correct writ to
force him to make an assessment but he could not be forced to
assign any certain value to it.29 The possibility of a remedy in
tort will be considered later.
2. Appeal From Action of Boards of Equalization
Certiorari will lie to question directly the findings of the
boards of equalizations, whether county or state, since these
boards are held to act judicially.30 Since it examines only the
record it is a very restricted writ when so used in tax cases. The
records of the assessor and of the appeal boards are not as com-
plete as those of regular courts since there is nothing to indicate
the considerations entering into the making of the determination
29 See Cooley, op. cit. sec. 1601, concerning mandamus against the as-
sessor in the various jurisdictions.
30 State ex rel. Harrison County Bank v. Springer (1896) 134 Mo. 212, 35
S. W. 589.
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of the tax official. Thus, most of the prejudicial errors would
not be indicated by the record. Certiorari is said to be the
proper writ when an increase in assessment is made without
jurisdiction, and its chief use has been to question the jurisdic-
tion of the tax officials.31 This is consistent with the use of the
writ in regular court proceedings, where the Supreme Court
noted, in considering a writ to a circuit court, that the chief
purpose was to keep inferior courts within the bounds of their
jurisdiction32 It is not, however, confined to matters of juris-
diction, and it may reach any other irregularity shown on the
record. 33 An adequate remedy by appeal usually results in the
writ.being denied, but this is not to be construed as requiring
an exhaustion of administrative appeals indicated previously8 4
Holding it is a writ of discretion and not of right, the courts feel
that they should deny it if the complainant can have other satis-
factory relief.35
Missouri courts have been wary in granting the writ to tax de-
cisions. In State ex rei. Gardner v. Hall36 the Court said,
"Certiorari is not a writ of right. Its issuance is within the
courts' discretion. That discretion should be warily exercised
when as here, it is brought by a single taxpayer and its effect,
if granted, will be to nullify the valuation for taxation of the
real property of St. Louis. Under such a state of facts it is a
question entitled to serious consideration whether the injury
done by the granting of the writ will not far exceed the relief
afforded. The presence of other remedies if the writ had been
refused have resulted in no denial of justice." Consequently
certiorari is not as widely used as injunction suits for the pur-
pose of securing judicial review of tax decisions.
3. Injunction Against the Collector of Revenue to Restrain
Collection of the Tax
This method of judicial appeal is the one most commonly used,
and it is apparently the most effective means of questioning ad-
ministrative decisions in tax cases. Since the Missouri courts
have held it to be a direct attack on the assessment it is not
subject to the limitations indicated as to collateral attack.37 All
of the substantive defects outlined in the previous section would
31 State ex rel. Cemetary Ass'n v. Casey (1908) 210 Mo. 235, 109 S. W. 1.
32 Turner v. Penman (1926) 220 Mo. App. 306, 282 S. W. 780.
83 State ex rel. Iba v. Mosman (1910) 231 Mo. 734, 133 S. W. 38.
34 Cooley, op. cit. sec. 1634.
35 State ex rel. Fairbanks-Morse and Co. v. Ayers (1906) 116 Mo. App.
90, 91 S. W. 306.
36 (1910) 282 Mo. 425, 221 S. W. 708.
87 Jefferson City Bridge and Transit Co. v. Blaser (1927) 318 Mo. 373,
300 S. W. 778.
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be available as a basis for a decree restraining the collector from
proceeding with collection of the tax. The Court would not be
confined to a review of the record, as it would be in a writ of cer-
tiorari; extrinsic evidence is admissible in the injunction
proceeding.
Here again it is essential that the statutory methods of
appeal shall have been exhausted. Also, the taxpayer should
tender the amount rightfully due before he brings suit. It is
the practice to enjoin collection of the amount wrongfully sought
to be collected and not the total tax.38 "He who seeks equity
must do equity" seems to be applied. To invoke equity juris-
diction some recognized ground of equity practice must be al-
leged, although the Missouri courts have not stressed this prin-
ciple in recent tax cases; the tendency seems to be toward
leniency, and to consider only the illegality involved and to takejurisdiction because of such illegality.3 9 However, in the decided
cases a ground of equitable relief has always been present
although not expressly mentioned. The commonly recognized
fundamental grounds of equitable relief are prevention of a cloud
on title to realty,40 irreparable injury to property or property
rights,4" inadequacy or lack of other remedies, and fraud in the
compilation of the assessment.4 2 Prevention of a multiplicity
of suits is a sufficient ground to justify the intervention of equity
when suit is brought by one taxpayer for the benefit of a large
number, even though none of the other equitable grounds is
present.43
In addition to its use as a device to attack an illegal assess-
ment, injunction is the proper means to prevent collection of an
illegal tax levy.44 Thus, where officers who have no right to levy
a tax or who levy a tax for an illegal purpose are without au-
thority, their actions are void and equity will restrain the exer-
cise of fraudulent and oppressive powers.
4. Defenses in Suits to Collect Taxes
Defenses in tax suits belong to the collateral forms of attack.
Thus, only questions of jurisdiction and of fraud, which renders
the entire judgment void, can be raised. Voidable judgments,
as See n. 3 above.
39 Cooley, op. cit. sees. 1641 et seq.
40 Mechanic's National Bank v. Kansas City (1880) 73 Mo. 555; Fowler v.
St. Joseph (1866) 37 Mo. 228; Lockwood v. St. Louis (1856) 24 Mo. 20.
41 First National Bank v. Meredith (1869) 44 Mo. 500.
42 Cooley, op. cit.
43 See Carelton v. Newman (1885) 77 Me. 408, 1 Atl. 194.
44 Overall v. Runzie (1878) 67 Mo. 203; Rannery v. Bader (1878) 67
Mo. 476; St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. v. Epperson (1888) 97 Mo. 300, 10 S. W.
478.
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that is, those which are only irregular and may be contested or
may be treated as valid by the taxpayer at his option, cannot be
attacked at this time, for reasons of public policy. The taxpayer
must indicate his wish to avoid it by taking the proper steps to
contest the tax before it is due and an effort is made to collect
it, for otherwise the collection of taxes at a critical time might
be seriously impaired. Thus we find the courts holding that
where, by the correct procedure, the taxing authorities secured
jurisdiction of the person or property of the defendant who had
an opportunity to be heard, he was not denied due process and
was held bound by the assessment, and the matter was res ad-
judicata in a subsequent suit to collect the tax; and the defend-
ant was considered estopped from asserting that he was not
properly assessed for that year. 4" In keeping with this holding,
in a suit to collect a tax, where as a defense it was alleged that
the State Board of Equalization acted discriminatorily in raising
certain taxes, the defense was rejected because it was a collateral
attack on the determination of the Board.40 In view of these
restrictions it is the better and safer course to bring an action
before the effort is made to collect the tax, or the taxpayer may
find himself estopped from asserting a just reason for nonpay-
ment of the tax. Only when the nullity of the tax is certain by
reason of the substantial defects set forth may the effort to
escape the tax be delayed until proceedings to collect it have
been started.
5. Remedies Available After the Tax is Collected
After the tax has been paid it is, as might be expected, a dif-
ficult matter to recover it. Actions for recovery which call into
question the acts of the administrative tax officers are attacks
on a tax deed to realty, suit for the recovery of the tax paid,
replevin for the recovery of personal property taken by distraint,
and tort actions for damages. They are all classed as collateral
attacks and are subject to the restrictions incident to such at-
tacks. Hence we do not find a large number of cases in Mis-
souri using these methods of attack on tax determinations.
Suits attacking tax titles are usually based on some matter of
form, such as an irregularity in the tax bill, in the papers filed,
or in the deed itself. Virtually the only question which could
be raised as to administrative acts would be as to jurisdiction df
the officials. If the land lay without the taxing district, or if
a levy were made based on an unconstitutional statute, the re-
suilting determination would be void at its inception and pro-
4 5 State ex reL. Arnold v. McClune (Mo. 1923) 252 S. W. 657.
46 State ex rel. Johnson v. Miners' and Merchants' Bank (1919) 279 Mo.
228, 213 S. W. 815.
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ceedings based upon it would have no legal effect. Consequently
the tax deed issued as a result of such proceedings would be void.
A suit to recover back the tax after it is paid may be based
on precisely the same matters as can be raised by way of de-
fense to a suit to collect the tax. Such a suit is maintainable
only where the tax was paid under duress or compulsion; an
amount paid voluntarily, no matter how invalid the original as-
sessment, cannot be recovered.47 A payment on the last day of
grace to avoid a penalty would be a payment under duress. It
is desirable that the administration of tax collection end with
payment, and that alleged defects not be raised subsequently,
for the same reasons of policy stated in connection with de-
fenses to suits.
In an early case replevin was not allowed to recover personal
property seized by distraint where it was sought thus to contest
a high assessment, the court holding that this was not a proper
function of a replevin suit.48 The holding does not exclude the
use of replevin for the purpose of attacking a tax determination
in the proper case. There has been no subsequent decisions
testing its use, although replevin is used in other states for this
purpose. 49 The matters available under other collateral attacks
on a tax should be available in a replevin suit.
In examining tort suits against the assessor or other tax of-
ficials, the analogy between a determination of a tax official and
a regular court judgment is again found to be stressed; it is
suggested that the tax official enjoys the immunity of the judge,
and is not liable in tort for an erroneous or mistaken holding.
This is not strictly true, for the assessor's immunity is not as
absolute and complete as the immunity associated with the exer-
cise of the judicial prerogative. It is the general American rule
that the assessor is liable in tort if he acts fraudulently, ma-
liciously, or negligently, and, probably, if he acts wholly without
authority or in excess of authority.5 0 It is necessary that he
commit a recognized tort, that he intend to commit the wrongful
act and that it did not occur through error or mistake. Thejustification for granting the assessor immunity for his mistakes
is that it is to the public's interest that tax officials act without
fear of incurring personal responsibility in order to secure a con-
sistent and impartial enforcement of tax laws. The collection
of taxes could be seriously impaired by a number of unfair and
47 State ex rel. Rice v. Powell (1854) 44 Mo. 436; Kansas City ex rel.
Elliott v. Holmes (1908) 127 Mo. App. 620, 106 S. W. 559.
'8 Hoskinson v. Helferstine (1883) 80 Mo. 23, aff'd (1883) 80 Mo. 140.
49 See Boyce v. Cutter (1888) 70 Mich. 539, 38 N. W. 464.
50 Cooley, op. cit. see. 1621; see Miller v. Horton (1897) 152 Mass. 540,
26 N. E. 100.
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unjustified damage suits; it is obvious that such suit would cause
officials to act in an excess of caution not compatible with an
adequate and speedy tax collection. In Missouri this means of
redress against the assessor has been little used. In Dobbins v.
Reed,51 a suit on the assessor's bond for raising the assessment
on the plaintiff's property without notice, the Court said that if
the assessor acted, as alleged, wholly without authority of law,
he was liable for any loss caused by his ursurpation of authority.
No cases were cited as authority, the decision being a perfunc-
tory one. Despite the paucity of such suits, the case seems suffi-
cient authority to predicate a right in tort. In any event it would
be hazardous to permit irregular proceedings to pass by with the
intention of holding the assessor personally liable in a later suit;
such relief should be sought only after all other means of adjust-
ment have failed.
III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
No attempt has been made to enumerate all the errors and de-
fects possible in the assessing and collection of taxes, for they
are limited only by the human capacity to err. It is inevitable
that in the application of laws which apply to such a large num-
ber of persons, whose judgments and opinions must vary as af-
fected by the circumstances brought to bear on each individual,
the net result will be considerable disagreement.
Summarizing: mere irregularities consisting of mechanical or
clerical errors in listing property, or failure to follow statutory
provisions which are designed to direct the assessor or other
officials, honest mistake of judgment or misuse of discretion
are not sufficient to secure a judicial review of the determination
of a tax official. They must be appealed to the statutory boards
of appeal, such as the county board of equalization. Lack ofjurisdiction, failure to follow statutory provisions designed to
protect the taxpayer, or dishonest irregularities and fraud in
the concoction of the assessment will permit a judicial appeal
and the invalidation of the assessment.
The remedies available are: possibly, mandamus against the
assessor, certiorari to assessors and boards of equalization, in-
junction against the collection of the tax, defenses in suits to
collect the tax, attacks on the validity of a tax deed, suits for
the recovery of the tax paid, and tort actions against the offend-
ing officials.
After examining the working of judicial appeal in tax cases
it is evident that the chief improvement must come through
correction of the administrative machinery. For practical pur-
poses judicial review has worked out rather well in Missouri,
51 (1900) 159 Mo. 77, 60 S. W. 70.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol17/iss3/7
NOTES
although in a number of individual cases the wrong complained
of has not been redressed. In general greater protection has
been given to the State than to the taxpayer, and justifiably so,
since taxation is for the purpose of securing the money necessary
for the maintenance of the government; and the methods used
must be speedy and in their nature summary, for delay and vacil-
lation would cripple governmental agencies and injure every
citizen far out of proportion to the individual wrong sought to
be corrected. The Missouri courts have recognized the danger
and have granted injunctions with great consideration, and have
consistently exercised their discretion strictly in allowing cer-
tiorari. In Trust Company v. Hill52 the Court, in speaking of
an injunction suit by a large number of taxpayers arising out
of the omission to assess suckling animals and poultry, said,
"We must rechart our course" in relation to tax cases. It was
not indicated what should be done to rechart the course of ju-
dicial review, for the case went off on other grounds, but the
Court indicated an awareness of the danger of judicial inter-
ference with tax officials.
A clarifying and crystallization of the rules governing judicial
appeal by legislative enactment would prove beneficial. The
proper methods of appeal should be set forth, along with the
matters which would be considered so that the taxpayer would
know his rights. One commentator 53 has argued that unequal
taxation is unjust taxation, and that there is no reason why
courts should not be open to remedy this as well as any other
wrong. He points out all that is needed is a statute regulating
and enlarging the jurisdiction of the courts in writs of certiorari,
as is true in New York and some other states, in order that they
may consider the correctness of the valuation when the case is
brought before them. The obvious danger, of course, is that
such a provision would open the courts to a huge number of
suits, for the cry of excessive valuation is a common complaint.
Tax officials are generally more capable of deciding disputes as
to valuation than are the courts, which deal in such matters
only incidentally. Tax officials are presumed to be experts and,
if not actually so, they have the benefit of experience through
dealing constantly with such matters.
It is not within the scope of this note to enumerate the changes
needed in the administrative process. In a sense, tax adminis-
tration is but one division of the greater field of administrative
law, which is in need of further rationalization, but it is further
complicated and differentiated from other branches by its pecu-
liar public significance. The summary procedure and practises
52 N. 27 above.
53 Judson, TAXATION IN MISSOURI (1904) 311.
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typical in tax administration, and which ought not exist in
other fields of administrative law, are justified by the para-
mount demands of government. It must suffice here to say
changes are inevitable, for it is inconceivable that many of the
present antiquated and ineffective practices can be continued."4
The Legislature in 1931 made some changes, chiefly in tax levies,
but it failed to touch the real problems which make the taxation
scheme a cumbersome one.
VICTOR P. KEAY, '33.
54 For a compilation of statistics which present a picture of the Missouri
tax situation see National Industrial Board, Inc., THE FIscAL PROBLEM IN
MissouRi (1930).
The general property tax is generally condemned by students of taxa-
tion. Prof. Seligman in his ESSAYS IN TAXATION (9th ed. 1921) says, "The
whole system is unsound . . . the tax as actually administered
is . . . one of the worst taxes known in the civilized world." In the
Missouri tax system the following defects seem of paramount importance:
(1) A lack of centralization in the administrative machinery and
a consequent lack of uniformity in tax methods over the State.
(2) The duplication of the powers and functions of the State Tax
Commission and the State Board of Equalization. The State Board
of Equalization seems a superfluous body.
(3) The failure to secure an adequate assessment of such intan-
gibles as notes, mortgages, bonds, and bank deposits.
(4) The unfortunate philosophy which has grown up among citizens
in regard to tax affairs, characterized by the apathy with which citi-
zens look upon perjury and dishonesty in returning property for
assessment.
(5) Inability to cope with the problem of valuing large and com-
plex properties, such as public utilities.
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